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SOCIO-CULTURAL CAPITAL AS THE BASIS OF WORKING STRATEGY OF HOUSEHOLD/FAMILY IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA AND THE NORTH OF KOSOVO*¹

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Abstract: This paper represents the result of a comparative research of socio-cultural capital features as the basis for working strategies of household/family in post-conflict societies of the former SFRY/Western Balkan. Republic of Srpska and Kosovo* represent case studies due to a set of similarities which are inherent to those social frameworks, and certain specificities which are making them “original” cases in social researches. Our research results indicate a sort of re-traditionalization of the role of post-war family members including their endeavour to maintain functionality and unity of family “at all costs” in societies of “high risk”. Besides, those results point to a set of other strategies that individuals and their households undertake in order to preserve “normality” of everyday life in societies which are facing the prevailing nationalistic ideologies twenty or fifteen years after the termination of the open armed conflicts, which “hinder” the establishment of peaceful conditions for life and work. In the first part of the paper, we are indicating the timeline of events being shaped by the two mentioned societies in the form of post-war societies in order to visualize the importance of socio-cultural capital more clearly, as the condition to develop the working strategies of post-war family households.

Keywords: socio-cultural capital, household, post-conflict/post-war society, post-socialist transformation, Republic of Srpska, Kosovo*.

1. Post-conflict societies of the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo* Sociological approach to the understanding of their specificities

Post-conflict society² became a usual phrase for the characterization of societies that appeared by the disintegration/destruction of former SFRY;

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although for those societies the official use of the phrase “Western Balkan”³ is more often applicable. Post-conflict societies are characterized by a newly established condition of *peace* and initial conditions for the achievement of tolerance and resolute *commitment* of the former warring factions to live in the same social frame in new peaceful circumstances as well. Post-Yugoslav area has inherited a war legacy (1991-1999), whose consequences have not been overcome yet. In contemporary societies in that area two contending aspects are dominating, which may be described, from one side, as the desire for reconciliation and determination of “personal” but not “collective” responsibilities for the consequences of wars, and from the other side, the attitude that interculturality is not sustainable in Western Balkan in the real sense of the word. In the meantime, a daily political rhetoric of *reconciliation* has prevailed, as well as declarative desire for euro integrations of the mentioned states, due to which the official statements of the representatives of those states are more affirmative when it is spoken about today's neighbours, and former citizens. Thus, during the past fifteen years a gradual transition of Western Balkan from the zone of armed conflict may be noticed, afterwards through the region in which democratic, economic, and security-related circumstances are established, to a state in which political elites of some states are oriented toward access to the European Union. That orientation of political elites implies their readiness for the adoption of “European values” such as: peace, democracy, dialogue, tolerance, human and national minorities’ rights etc. As the citizens of former Yugoslav republics, in the period of post-socialist transformation, were exposed to a whole set of daily political rhetoric – from extreme nationalism to “facing European future” with the neglecting of conflict past – it is not difficult to recognize the impact of action of numerous international organizations representatives in post-war societies of former SFRY. There is a wide spectrum of those organizations representatives during the years of their presence in post-conflict zones, which as per the pattern, spreads from the humanitarian relief (mostly in the form of food, blankets, medicaments) until the *progress* of infrastructure and economy as the form of post-war society development, and their direct impact on the internal political decision making within those states. Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially the Republic of Srpska) and Kosovo*, as the territories which had been in the first post-war years under international administration, and later on “only” under the supervision of “international community”, are characteristic cases for the illustration of those forms of assistance (Košarac, Milošević-Šošo, 2014: 530).

² Part of this research, which refers to the society of Republic of Srpska, has already been available to academia, published in *Sociological Review* in Serbia. Please see: Milošević, Božo (2011), “Radne strategije domaćinstava u tranziciji post-ratnog društva – primer Republike Srpske”, *Sociološki pregled*, 45(2): 169–192.

³ It is about political and media construction which has served in the last ten years as the marking of the majority of the territory of former Yugoslavia and Albania. Namely, in the summit of the state’s members of European Union held in Thessaloniki 2003, the post-Yugoslav space was called “Western Balkan” by which the geographic determination of South-Eastern Europe was marginalized and excluded from usage, with the neglecting of the construction of *post-Yugoslav area* so as emerging states and their citizens supposedly make distance from the common past of life in the same state as soon as possible. “Western Balkan” means the states of the former territory of Yugoslavia, without Slovenia adding Albania (Svilar, 2010: 503).

Nevertheless, the specificity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the Republic of Srpska within that state) is reflected in the achievement of at least the minimum common interests of three irreconcilable ethnical groups (Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian), which is reflected in the signing of Dayton's Peace Accord (by which negotiations of belligerent parties, under the auspices of USA, terminated on 21st of November, 1995). The Accord was signed officially on the 14th of December, 1995 in Paris by former representatives of the mentioned ethnical groups: Alija Izetbegović (Bosnian), Franjo Tuđman (Croatian), and Slobodan Milošević (Serbian). By that accord the dispute over territories, as the most sensitive issue of negotiations, was settled "in favour of" the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51%) in relation to the territory of the other entity – Republic of Srpska (49%). Besides the issue of territory, that Accord implies the recognition of the existent international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as "rights of entities to establish 'parallel special relationships' with adjacent countries" and obligation "to respect standards of basic human rights and freedoms" (Slović, 2011: 345). The greatest achievement of the Dayton's Peace Accord was the halt of four-year civic war. Nevertheless, even today, almost twenty years upon that Accord signing, there are a lot of unsettled issues, which are directly reflected to everyday life of all social actors, and one of them is that of the integration or division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in further future (Slović, 2011: 350).⁴

The case of Kosovo* is to be a specific one: territory which - after the entry of NATO troops and UN administration⁵ into the area of this Serbian province (June 12th, 1999) - became under international protectorate.

Central tasks of UNMIK administration, immediately after the protectorate establishment, should have enabled the following:

1. Establishment of functional interim civic administration, including maintenance of law and order;
2. Promotion of essential autonomy and self-governance establishment, including the hold of elections;
3. Facilitation of political process for future status of Kosovo determination (Yannis, 2004: 67).⁶

⁴ On the negative consequences of the Dayton's Peace Accord, i.e. implementation of "Bonn's authorizations" by the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina see in already quoted paper of Košarac, Milošević-Šošo (p. 2014: 530).

⁵ КФОР/КFOR (Kosovo Force) и УНМИК/UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo). In KFOR there are soldiers whose states are not members of NATO. The leading role in the troops command belongs to leading European countries such as: Great Britain, Italy, and from 2011 Germany and Austria exclusively, although the troops command is as per the rule based on the principle of "rotation" of commanders from different countries whose soldiers are in the service of the mission in Kosovo*.

Mission of KFOR was also based on the Security Council Resolution (SCUN) 1244, and KFOR was supposed to do the following:

1. Monitor, verify and, where necessary, harmonize requirements from military-technical agreement and demilitarize KLA⁷;
2. Establish and maintain a secure environment, including public security and order;
3. Provide assistance to the Mission of United Nations in Kosovo, including basic state functions until their transformation, in order to facilitate peace and stability in Kosovo (Yannis, 2004).

KFOR, as per the Article 11 of the Security Council Resolution 1244, was supposed to provide a secure environment in which all refugees and internally displaced persons would return to their homes. “UNMIK mandate was almost unprecedented pursuant to the standards of UN in the field. Not only was it authorized to take full responsibility for interim administrative governance over the territory of Kosovo, but it got a central political role in conflict resolutions as well” (Yannis, 2004: 61). Fifteen years after the entry in the territory of Kosovo (and Metohija), UNMIK has been losing its former legitimacy bearing in mind the fact that the representatives of that mission exist only in the Northern part of the Serbian province⁸, including a minimal number of employees while Albanians ignore each reference to that mission. In the official reports, the work of UNMIK mission was assessed as unsuccessful as well, while it is emphasized that “international interim administration did not manage to create a necessary atmosphere for multi-ethnic society” (Garcia-Orrico, 2009: 153). The work of KFOR mission may also be described as controversial⁹, taking into account the “March violence” (in March 2004), when around 3870 people were expelled (mostly Serbs), and 35 religious buildings of the Serbian Orthodox Church were burned, out of which 18 were monuments of culture, and 3 Orthodox graveyards were desecrated.¹⁰ The respective reports of the international community representatives state “inability of the international civic and security-related presence to prevent ethnically motivated violence in March 2004 – five years after the intervention – gave a heavy blow to their credibility and cast serious doubts in the possibility of future peaceful and multi-

⁶ A decade and a half afterwards, UNMIK has had rather formal than essential function, bearing in mind the newly established “Kosovo institutions”, which are the “successors” of UNMIK administration.

⁷ Agreement on the demilitarization of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was signed on 21st of June, 1999.

⁸ The North of Kosovo* is still mostly inhabited by Serbs, and Serbs are boycotting institutions of “Republic of Kosovo”.

⁹ For example, we will quote the Reports of Amnesty International, which indicate the trafficking of women in Kosovo*, after the entering of KFOR. See also: <http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/Amnesty-EUR7001004.pdf>.

¹⁰ There were 19 people killed (Serbs), and 954 of them were seriously injured in the 33 individual attacks by 51,000 of ethnic Albanians (see: http://www.Kosovo*.gov.rs/rs/vesti/item/1538-devet-godina-od-pogromana-srbima-na-Kosovo*).

ethnic Kosovo” (Garcia-Orrico, 2009: 153). In the post-conflict period longer than one decade, Kosovo* had featured the phases of open conflicts succession, ostensible tolerance among antagonistic groups and new conflicts, which indicated again the need for presence of international organizations, and the “strengthening” of the monitoring of the newly established institutions of the “Kosovo Republic”.

Serbs from the Republic of Srpska (within Bosnia and Herzegovina) faced similar pressures, which had, regarding Kosovo*, a guaranteed position of internationally recognized entity by the mentioned Dayton's Peace Accord. Besides, Serbs in the Republic of Srpska represent the ethnic majority, which was not to be the case with Serbs in the whole of Kosovo*, and due to that their everyday life takes place in the form of fear from the possible expulsion from their homes. Pressures on the Serbs in the Republic of Srpska (RS) are more intense from institutional point of view, which is reflected in constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) mostly without the consent of one constitutive part (entity) representative – the Republic of Srpska. Those pressures are not being reflected in the form of Constitution changes, but in the ones regarding some legal provisions as well as interference in “economic policy creating a legal framework for foreign companies’ activity, which led to an enormous foreign trade deficit and destruction of the remained enterprises of BiH” (Košarac, Milošević-Šošo, 2014: 530).

The North of Kosovo* as per some of its features, is similar to the Republic of Srpska. Although it has not been recognized as an official entity in “the independent Republic of Kosovo” yet, at everyday institutional and political level, that territory is not under the powers of the authorities from Priština. The similarity is also in the fact that Serbs in the North of Kosovo* constitute a distinct ethnic majority, and have special links with (their republic) Serbia from whose state budget, all its institutions are being financed. As such, the North of Kosovo* has been surviving for fifteen years as “the last defense line of the Serbian state”, that is, the last obstacle on the road of completion of sovereignty of “the Kosovo state”.¹¹

¹¹After the so-called *July crisis* broke out on 25th of July 2011, since a group of special forces of Kosovo police tried to take over its control at the administrative borders in the North of Kosovo, Serbs radicalized efforts to distinct from the rest of that Serbian province (See: *Appendix 8 and 9*). Physical barricades were set up on the roads connecting the northern part with the rest of the province, and the whole day attendance of people whose role was to prevent Kosovar or EULEX police to pass through the North of Kosovo*. Since then the role of KFOR has become dominant, due to the fact that former supreme commander Erhard Biller had the role of negotiator with Serbian politicians. Negotiations were held in Brussels at general dissatisfaction of the Serbs from Kosovo* with the achieved agreements. So, a socio-political misbalance occurred, taking into account the fact that official negotiating teams of Serbia and Kosovo were reaching agreements, while local population was resisting more intensely to the efforts of barricades removal. After many unsuccessful attempts in the second half of 2011 in the municipality of Zvečan, KFOR obtained permission for live ammunition use, what happened on the 1st of June 2012 where three Serbs were wounded.

Hence, we can only conditionally speak on post-conflict territory of the North of Kosovo*, taking into account numerous actions of citizens' security violation,¹² but on the territory of "conflicts of low intensity"¹³ where the limit between "conflict" and "post-conflict" is unclear, and everyday life of citizens deeply subordinated to that unclear demarcation line.¹⁴ Hence, in Kosovo*, that is, Northern part of that region, cannot be essentially spoken as a post-conflict "territory" until institutional set up has been established, which would be recognized by all actors in the field ("international community", Serbian, "Kosovo"/Albanian institutions), and such scenario is imposed almost exclusively through the integration of Serbs into "the Kosovo institutions" (which Serbs have been opposing for years). In the near future, some changes arising of the signed "Brussels' Agreement" (19th of April, 2013) may be expected, and holding of "Kosovo" local elections in the whole territory of the province (November, 2013), after that the elected presidents of municipalities in the North of the province "agreed" to rule local governments pursuant to laws of "the Republic of Kosovo" (under the condition to proceed to the establishment of the Community of Serbian municipalities). Although there is a chance that those changes lead to the establishment of institutional order, which may be considered as a legitimate one by all political actors in Kosovo*, dissatisfaction by the "new reality" (which suggests a more transparent presence of "the Republic of Kosovo" in its North) may cause some new violent actions by "some malcontents" from the opposed ethnical group. Taking such daily political circumstances into account, it cannot be supposed where peace will be established essentially, but rather entering a new phase of "low intensity" conflict, which would leave new consequences to everyday life of all social actors.

¹²In the first two months of 2013, in Northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, twenty explosive devices echoed on houses, terraces of flats, and cars of those town inhabitants.

¹³In daily political purposes the phrase "zone of frozen conflict" is being used more often.

¹⁴In the meantime the asymmetry of power occurred, that is misbalance of power of Serbs and Albanians. As so-called Kosovo institutions were established and intensively strengthened after 1999, today in the province there are at one side personnel, outfit, arms, economic and business potentials media control and telecommunications, and at another side very restricted infrastructural potentials and limited number of people "with selective arms choice and other resources, but decisive in their intentions" (Randelović, 2008: 141). Besides, post-conflict everyday life in Kosovo* was not stopped to be pervaded by some forms of so-called informative war. It is about insufficiently shaped concept of "contemporary way of conflicting in which information become a crucial resource and represent main weapon being used by opposing parts for the achievement of supremacy and victory in the war in order to achieve concrete national interests" (Randelović, 2008: 145).

2. The importance of working strategies for the survival of household/family in post-war societies of the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo*

In post-conflict societies whose members are facing a set of inconveniences in institutional-political view, there is the whole segment of social actors' life, which is known in social sciences as "everyday life". That, at first sight, simple word in the societies which are in the focus of our researches, represents a core of all people/nations survival in post-conflict societies, and especially the ones belonging to demographically fewer ethnical groups. That is the reason why we are interested in studying the effects of "survival" of social actors in the two post-conflict societies (RS and Kosovo*) from sociological point of view at the same time. We approached the research of working strategies being implemented by social actors in the field of everyday life, and whose essential objective is the preservation of functionality and integrity of family in a social framework of undermined sovereignty and personal integrity, which necessary led to the weakening of all social organizations.

It is about the comparison of the two (research) case studies – in the example of RS and Kosovo* societies. The technique for data collecting in RS was a questionnaire (489 interviews in 297 households), while in Kosovo* 120 in-depth interviews were conducted with family members of different ethnical groups.¹⁵ Although different as per its nature, way, speed and "depth" of the obtained data from respondents, these two research groups are complementary to each other. They are employed in that way in this research, and in the purpose of more meaningful sociological understanding of strategies in action, which are in the sphere of everyday life inherent to actors in post-conflict societies. Basically, we were interested in the working strategies of households in post-conflict societies, but indirectly we obtained data on interpersonal relationships of family members, i.e. on the revitalization of traditionally-patriarchal structure of the family. Thus, we were able to compose a sort of "mosaic" of everyday life features of individuals and their households in the two post-conflict societies.

Working strategies of households were in the focus of our interest due to the fact the mentioned societies are passing through - besides post-conflict – a two-decade post-socialist transformation, which further aggravated the strategy of "survival" of individuals in post-war societies. At the same time, the term "working strategy" is comprehended as "the notion by which analogously to the strategy in general, important, basic and long-term objectives of the activity of society and its individual organizational units are determined, and in accordance with that, the most appropriate routs, means and organizational forms for

¹⁵In the North of Kosovo* interviews were conducted exclusively with women because of the fact that the researcher (in this case, also, a woman) was neither able to talk to the men from some ethnical groups from that area (because of traditionally/misogynistic motivated rejection by their members), nor she had security conditions to conduct interviews in central and southern part of Kosovo* (which are mostly inhabited with ethnical Albanians).

directing of individuals and groups activities are also determined” (Milošević, 2011: 170). It follows that the working strategy of the family (that is, household), as the basic social community, is always compatible with the general socio-economic conditions of the society whose part that family (household) is. Taking into account the fact that societies - whose working strategies of household/family were examined - are deeply subordinated to the processes of post-war and post-socialist transformation, it is clear that everyday life is also subordinated to that transformation, and therefore to the working strategies of family/household¹⁶ in the societies of RS and Kosovo*. “Depending upon the socio-economic development, households developed some specific strategies, which mostly relied on traditionally inherited patterns. In that sense, it may be said that households are ‘great procrastinators’ in the conditions of wider social pressure to change their working strategy” (Milošević, 2011: 171).

Bearing in mind the collapse of state institutions in the post-war period and much too long post-socialist transformation of societies of former SFRY, the mentioned traditionally inherited specific patterns are - at the same time - one of the most important reasons of the survival of functional family households. The survival of those households in the conditions of chaotic change in their everyday life, is conditioned above all by intrafamily solidarity, and those potentials of family which are contained in the “competences” of its members in their motivation, intrafamily relationships, and the ones of the family and its members towards a narrower and wider social environment. In contrast to peaceful social conditions where common life of family household members (primarily in urban environment) was reduced to common spending of spare time, in the conditions of social changes with negative sign – such as socio-economic shortages (crises, recessions), social and natural breakdowns (wars, revolutions, fires, floods) – “families mostly revitalize traditional or create new household strategies in order to survive, despite the unfavorable general social conditions” (Milošević, 2011: 172). That is the example of the society of post-socialist and - at the same time – specifically, post-war transformation which is in the focus of our sociological interest.

One more argument of family households’ survival is relevant in the described social conditions – in sociology known as socio-cultural capital of family. That kind of capital “within which the struggle of man for existence is

¹⁶It is not superfluous to emphasize that “in the official political speech and some quasi-scientific analyses, family and household are mostly considered as synonyms. On the other hand, in economic analyses of “business doing” household is considered as a pure economic category, without taking into account the fact it is about such consuming unit including individuals being in kinship (by blood, spiritual, adoptive or by marriage), who are, therefore, emotionally connected, as well as by specific rights and obligations. For household recognition as consuming organized family unit, it is important that it is a community of persons living and eating separately from other persons in the environment in a separate living space (house, flat, or some separate room) which has a separate entrance. Number of household members may be from one member to more families which do not have to be in relationship, but they are treated as household because they live together in a particular room” (Milošević, 2011: 170-171).

viewed from the wider cognitive aspect, from the aspect in which economic relationships and ties are interwoven with interpersonal and group-like socio-cultural ties and relationships” (Milošević, 2011: 172), represents the key of sociological understanding of family survival in crisis-stricken social circumstances.¹⁷ Understanding of socio-cultural capital (in our case family) is in direct connection with Bourdieu’s understanding of “symbolic capital”, which represents a sum of socio-cultural values whose driver is tradition, due to which, besides economic (measurable/physical) capital “a part of unrecognized calculation of the donor must be taken into account, in order to meet their needs, regardless of the fact they *are pretending* not to notice those calculations in such reciprocal relationship” (Bourdieu, 1999: 206). The reason lies in the fact that family household is not founded only on economic relations among the members, but it may be referred to the whole network on interpersonal relationships among the members, who, in the functioning of family household give the sense to economic and all other strategies at the same time, which must be taken by individuals in order to survive under conditions of social changes with a negative sign.

Following the example of RS and Kosovo* societies working strategies of family households, and within them, socio-cultural capital of families receive their full meaning, which is transformed from socio-theoretical to the applied everyday life’s aspect. For both societies being in the focus of our research (RS and Kosovo*), it may be said they are in the phase of transitional modernization, which is featured by the determination of the market way of doing business, and still in the initial phases of civil society building. The basic similarity of those societies is featured in the fact that they are going through the phase of post-socialist transformation compounded by the disintegration of the former common state (SFRY), war damage, international isolation, hyperinflation, and entry of foreign military and civic troops into those territories under (simplified) explanation of “peace establishment”.¹⁸ Those processes conditioned a very important similarity which is “the reverse side” of general socio-political circumstances being afflicted to the societies of RS and Kosovo* – collapse of the system of values, disorganization and “self-abandonment of the individual” – to his own everyday life. Should we bear in mind that everyday life is a non-reflective field of social life, which “does not explain itself, does not understand itself, does not reflect itself, and it does not have a distance toward itself”

¹⁷ In this paper the notion/phrase of socio-cultural capital “corresponds more to the problem understanding which is in connection with household strategies, as the ones of a kind of organized activity in the sphere of family earning, and the notion/phrase of human resources and the one corresponding to it, human capital, point to the individual orientations of family members which are providing them with opportunity (chance) to appear in the market and provide existential resources for himself and his family as well” (Milošević, 2011: 173).

¹⁸ Although RS and so-called “Republic of Kosovo” represent to some extent recognizable independent entities/states, the impact of Western countries on the political decision making is apparent, due to which it cannot be talked on sovereign territories. Even though we are talking only about the North of Kosovo* as the territory which is still under the direct supervision and financing of the Republic of Serbia, at the same time we are talking about the territory being under intense international control and supervision.

(Blagojević, 1995: 182), the necessity of sociological research and understanding of processes which are immanent to everyday life of people in post-conflict societies is clearer. Working strategies of households are one of the more important parts of everyday life, due to which they are to be in the focus of this research.

3. Empirical indicators of working strategies in post-conflict societies of the Republic of Srpska and the North of Kosovo*

Empirical indicators of family households' strategies in post-conflict societies of RS and the North of Kosovo*, which are conditioned by the features of socio-cultural capital, derived from the methodological framework of our research. We have already emphasized that in the territory of RS (in 297 households) 489 questionnaires were conducted, and in the territory of Kosovo* 120 in-depth interviews. Those two research techniques in this comparative research showed their pros and cons, but they "enlightened" by their comparative application a set of advantages of essential importance for sociological understanding of the working strategies of household/family in post-war social conditions. In the first, theoretic part of the paper we indicated to the socio-cultural capital characteristics, which we understood as a specific joint of social relationships and (sub) cultural values, which is particularly evident in primary social groups (communities) such as family (and its household). Therefore, replies to the questionnaire, that is questions posed within in-depth interviews, provided by the respondents/members of families individually or "on behalf of household" within the analysis of the obtained data – are considered to be relevant semantic element creating socio-cultural capital of family and having impact on the working strategies shaping of their households.

3.1 Understanding of socio-cultural capital of household/family from some respondent's perspective


Individual, through the belonging to family as a primary social community, and other social groups as well, belongs at the same time to the whole social structure. Bearing that in mind, we tried through the self-perception of the own belonging to some social class/stratum (following the example of the RS respondents), that is through the understanding of own life conditions (in the North of Kosovo*), determine the initial parameters of socio-cultural capital of the mentioned societies/families.

Table 1: Self-perception of social class belonging

Consider to belong:	Number	%
Upper class	6	1.2
Upper middle class	50	10.2
Middle class	341	69.7
Labour class	84	17.2
Lower class	8	1.6
Total respondents:	489	100

In the case of RS respondents, more than three quarters of the respondents consider to “carry” the middle class potential (collective replies to belong to the middle or upper middle class), while the replies to consider themselves as members of the upper and low class have almost the same (low) occurrence (see Table 1). Due to the features of the chaotic post-socialist and post-war transition of the society Republic of Srpska, it is probably a relative indicator by which the respondents – “from their perspective” – see their class potentials in the whole of that and the society (as such). In this respect, it is the most general indicator on the fact what the possibilities of socio-cultural capital of their family are, which working strategies of household they rely on. In the case of the respondents/female respondents from the North of Kosovo*, due to the special characteristics of in-depth interview as research technique, they have not been required to declare themselves on the self-perception of class belonging, but to describe their living conditions. In the first plan of those living conditions understanding they mention housing conditions, which is not to be a coincidence, but necessary social circumstance caused by the impacts of war on the area’s mobility of population, and their way of living in the altered social conditions and in the area. Therefore, the collected data from our empirical research (from the replies of respondents) indicate to the direct conditioning of internal displacement to their social position in (new) milieu. That means living conditions of those (Serbian) families, which were migrating during the armed conflicts from other parts of Kosovo* to the North of that Serbian province, in general are worse than the ones of the families which all the time remained to live in their houses/apartments. This research shows that, out of the total number of respondents 27 (67.5%), of Serbian families live in their apartments, and out of the total number of Albanian families 25 (62.5%) of them live in their apartments, 10 (50%) families from Bosnian ethnical group live in their apartment, and (100%) of Roma families live in their apartment (see Chart 1).¹⁹

¹⁹Roma families live in their apartments from 2011 since the settlement under the title “Roma mahala”, in Southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica has been built, under the auspices of international organizations.

Figure 1: Do you live in your house/apartment?

The age of the residential area, except in the case of Roma families living in (built for them) a brand new settlement (after the open armed conflicts in 1999) indicates to the fact those female respondents and their families live in houses and apartments built many decades ago. The appearance of the living area (houses/apartments) in which displaced and exiled persons in Kosovo* reside, indicates to their relative solid state, should we take into account that those are houses/apartments which, during ethnical conflicts (1997-1999), were not systematically being burnt. Nevertheless, during the empirical research conduct we did not notice that families rehabilitated or invested considerable financial resources in additional equipping and aesthetic shaping of their living area. It is more about the area which is rather functional for living of some number of family members than on the appearance of the area. That indicates the scarcity of funds, which may be invested by families in apartments/houses equipping, but it also indicates the unwillingness for their living area “refreshing” due to the present fear from the repeated (forced) leave of their homes. That fear is especially present with respondents/female respondents of Serbian ethnical belonging, which is to be one more indicator it is here about the territory, which is still subject to ethnically motivated conflicts.

Should we compare those findings (from the territory of Kosovo*) with the “claims” of respondents from RS, where 76% of respondents think to belong to “the middle class” it may be said we reached the congruent statements even during the research conducted in Kosovo*. Nevertheless, belonging to “the middle class”, which is exclusively based on self-perception of theirs and the status of their family in the given social area, is more conditioned by the fact of everyday life of all family members “all together”, “under the same roof”, and employment of one or more members of family household. When individuals “see” their living conditions in that way, they take into account the fact in most cases in their milieu there are people living in “much more difficult” living

conditions, so therefore they consider themselves the members of “those middle”.²⁰

Bearing in mind the fact that class interests in each society of inequalities strive to be protected by institutional and non-institutional mechanisms, it was necessary to determine whether that kind of “protection” may have impact on the reinforcement of socio-cultural capital of families (belonging to different classes). Thus, institutional reinforcement of socio-cultural capital of family appears to be as the second important fact of some groups social position in post-conflict societies of RS and Kosovo* (what is partly seen from the data in the Table 2). From these data, it can be deduced that family represents a respective part in it, no matter it is about the fact whether we wished to know which collective acting (“institution/organization/group”) supports their socio-cultural capital (the share of family is one third – 28,8%) or whether we asked them in which way their socio-cultural capital is achieved (share of personal connections and acquaintances, which are mostly part of family relationships – 20%).

The fact that the largest share of respondents within this research conducted in RS (73. 6%) believe that family interests are best protected by the family itself or by an individual within the family, indicates the strong “turn” which the citizens of post-socialist and post-war societies had already experienced in the transition period, at least when it is about the trust/distrust in state institutions. So, a high share of respondents who first of all believe “only to themselves” indicates the perception of all other social institutions, and which are (although respondents do not talk directly about it) from their perspective “damaged”, that is, “are not worth the trust” which citizens expressed their unbiased attitudes. Such belief of respondents is founded on the feeling of “abandonment to yourself” in turbulent, in the war and post-war years, due to which the trust (distrust) in institutions (first of all, state) is almost “assumed”, even two decades after the war.

²⁰ Respondents do not talk about classes, but use the terms “less”, “more” and “middle”. Qualitative technique to which the research conducted in the North of Kosovo* was founded, indicates the commitment of the researcher to hear, first of all, “the voices of ordinary people” and their perception of their everyday life, but we are aware of the limits making the results subject to critics of economic sociology.


Table 2: Opinion of respondents on the fact which kind of organization or institution best protects the interest of members of society to which they belong today

Institution/organization/group	Number	%
State	73	14.9
Political parties	11	2.2
Syndicates	25	5.1
Professional associations	20	4.1
Family	141	28.8
Man himself protects his interests the best	219	44.8
Total number of respondents	489	100

Congruent results were obtained in the research conducted in the territory of the North of Kosovo*. Nevertheless, there it is about the territory which is still passing through “conflicts of low intensity”, which are reflected in efforts of Albanian authorities from Priština to take over the institutional control over the North of that Serbian province (which is still under the institutional control of the Republic of Serbia). Bearing that in mind, respondents belonging to the two most numerous/antagonistic ethnical groups – Serbian and Albanian – still talk declaratively on the trust in institutions of Serbia (Serbs), that is, Kosovo (Albanians). Nevertheless, thanks to the research advantages of in-depth interview, we managed to find out from the interview with respondents/female respondents that certain number of Albanians in the period after 2008 (when Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed its independence) more rely on financial assistance from their relatives living and working abroad, than believe in the institutions of “the state of Kosovo”, which may be noticed below (see in Chart 2).

In the replies of Serbian respondents/female respondents from Kosovo* there is another trend, bearing in mind the fact they state they do not have relatives abroad, so that they are directly dependent on the institutional assistance from (their) Republic of Serbia (in the form of employment opportunities, or in the form of some kind of social assistance). As the unemployment rate of the inhabitants of Kosovo* is very high (although we can consider only unofficial data, which range up to 50% of the unemployed), it is clear the “orientation” of the large majority of population to themselves and their family. Similar situation was recognized in the research conducted in RS.

The similarity noticed in both researches is very important (in RS and Kosovo*), and it tackles the respondents emphasize that some facts, which reinforce their socio-cultural capital (such as personal “acquaintances”) are very important in the way of employment obtaining as the condition for existential survival of their family. The *Table 3* clearly illustrates it, and especially when it comes to respondents from RS.


Figure 2: Material assistance to respondents**Table 3: Opinion of respondents on the fact how important acquaintances with other people are (friends, acquaints, relatives, neighbours) for regular, additional or better job finding for their household members**

Importance of acquaintance for job	Number of households	%
Very important	112	37.8
Less important	10	3.4
The least important	13	4.4
Irrelevant	161	54.4
Total number of households	296	100

Although slightly more than a half of the respondents, within the research conducted in RS, think that acquaintances are “irrelevant” for job obtaining, the second half of respondents believes in the opposite; which is completely congruent with the statements of the respondents from Kosovo*. Respondents from Kosovo* emphasize that without acquaintance “connection” “you can achieve nothing”, not only in the way of job obtaining but for less important everyday activities (for example, issuing of personal documents, queuing up with the doctor, etc.). The importance of personal acquaintances is so pronounced in all ethnical groups, that it is almost “implied”, which leads to the conclusion on the revitalization of traditional patterns of assistance provision in the conditions of social (state) institutions collapse. That “implied” fact is more evidently manifested when it is about employment obtaining (which, under conditions of distinct lack of money, represents almost an impossible mission). Nevertheless, although they think acquaintances are important, a larger number of respondents emphasize it in negative sense through the statements such as: “No job”, “You do not have your people”, “Nobody wishes to provide you with

information on some job at all". Those statements indicate the absence of not only institutional, but elementary interpersonal support and assistance beyond primary connections in one of the very important existential need meeting as well. Such conclusion follows from the respondents' statements (in both researches) that they can rely to nobody when they need assistance in financial sense.²¹ Nevertheless, our empirical findings indicate the fact that neither members of family household (being part of our sample) help to some other people, except in few cases of their children or parents assistance (living within the same household).

Figure 3: Material assistance provided by family members in the North of Kosovo*



Such replies indicate the abandonment of family members to themselves/their family once again, since besides the distrust in official state institutions, they show certain distrust in the relatives, neighbours and friends' readiness to be helpful for them in everyday life situations. That indicates at the same time the exclusive focus on resources of their own families, by which our claim has been confirmed on the importance of socio-cultural capital within primary familiar relationships for the members of RS and Kosovo* societies survival in post-war conditions.

²¹ That conclusion does not rely only partly to all Albanian and Roma families/households from Kosovo*, first of all to the ones whose members live and work abroad. But, even respondents from those families/households emphasize they obtain such assistance "once a year", before the biggest Islamic holiday (Eid).

Table 4: Opinion of respondents on that which job strategies more successfully secure resources for their family life

Business strategies	Number	%
Residential place change for better job or greater earning	40	8.7
Work each paid job	49	10.6
Work longer than normal working ours	38	8.2
Work more than one job at the same time in different companies	61	13.2
Work job below your qualification with significantly higher salary	14	3.0
Work with full-time job additional jobs under contract (part-time jobs)	64	13.9
Working informal jobs in informal economy	6	1.3
Acquire new knowledge, skills	65	14.1
Initiate some own business	72	15.6
Establish and own company or with other owners	52	11.3
Total number of respondents	461	100

It appears from the research conducted in RS that people in that milieu are more ready to deploy their additional efforts in the way of (self) employment, and not to direct exclusively on “someone’s” assistance in job obtaining (which is the case with larger fraction of respondents from the North of Kosovo*) (Table 4).

Therefore, people from the North of Kosovo* are more or less aware of the high rate of unemployment, so that some (still) expect more the assistance of state (mostly respondents of Serbian ethnicity), while others (mostly of Albanian and Roma ethnicity) “turn” more toward their own private business or/and work in the private sector. The entrepreneurship, as the initial step toward employment, is reflected in the way of job search. The example of the North of Kosovo* indicates the importance of earlier “acquaintances” thanks to which they obtained jobs (mostly men). From the research conducted in RS it is seen that 73.3% of the respondents believe they will obtain a job by the official state institutions (such as the Job Centre). Such replies of respondents from RS indicate to the presence of certain trust in the state institution (since it is about the state entity which Serbs are treating with respect), differently from the ones from the North of Kosovo*, whom, at the very mention of formally existent state institutions for employment from the North of Kosovo*, reacted with contempt and ridicule (since in that milieu the institutions of Serbia are largely collapsed).

Nevertheless, from both researches we may take the conclusion that respondents foster the belief they will at least manage to obtain some kind of social support, when official state institutions cannot guarantee them any (decent) job. Respondents were not willing to discuss quite openly with the researcher on that, although it may be concluded that fact contains the inertia of experience on “social state” starting from the period of command-planning guidance of social life (when it was calculated with great interference of state in the sphere of labour and way of earning) (Milošević, 2011: 181). Therefore, some similarities may be noticed among the respondents of both post-war (and post-socialist)

social entities, which are reflected in the belief that political participation (either of respondents or their family members) is very important for job obtaining. Therefore, they think that “political engagement” in conjunction with “right people knowing”, makes a “winning combination” in the way of their employment or for one of their family members and, at the same time, desirable social mobility. That may be especially illustrated by data from the research conducted in RS (Table 5).

Table 5: Opinion of respondents on that what today the most important for advancement in the society is

The most important for advancement in the society is:	Number	%
Origin from rich family	40	8.2
Quality education	45	9.2
Ambitiousness	54	11.1
Hard work	28	5.7
Knowing of right people	117	24.0
Political engagement	122	25.0
Willingness to take risk at work	41	8.4
Dexterity in compliance with statutory requirements	8	1.6
Obedience	33	6.8
Total number of respondents	488	100

Out of three, in sociology most frequently stated channels of social mobility (education, dealing with politics, marriage contraction), it has proven that dealing with politics is “the most secure” capital of individual, what is stated out by respondents themselves, indicating it is the way to help their family members obtain employment or an adequate (“better”) working post. The lack of that “capital” is an essential obstacle for employment in the post-war years of RS and Kosovo*. A greater number of unemployed respondents agrees on that, either respondents from RS who are not active politically, and who state that “they do not know right people”, they “are not members of the party in power” or the ones from the North of Kosovo*, who say they do not have an appropriate job since they “are not politically suitable” due to earlier and now inappropriate political attitudes which are now familiar to their local community members and political elites having great power in that community. Although respondents in both researches state that education and hard work should be real values that can provide individuals with “decent life”, they conclude that it is not the case in their societies.

In the research conducted in the North of Kosovo*, a group of respondents/female respondents emphasizes the importance of urban/indigenous origin as strong support to personal identity in the local milieu (as prestige, which makes the support to socio-cultural capital), but they emphasize that war led to the fact the mentioned is not visible in post-war conditions, since in that

milieu politics is dealt by immigrants (“those other”), who are people of rural origin and do not belong to “natives” in that milieu, but who have much clearer vision for their own social promotion in the (new) urban environment. Here, it is about a kind of intra-ethnic differentiation, which bears a status feature. That intraethnic division to natives and immigrants indicates a strong “disappointment” of a number of people to emerging social conditions, since in the former state (Yugoslavia) they belonged to the middle stratum, living on their own work in working organizations financed by the state, observing laws of the same state. Post-war period conditioned, at least in the first years, a kind of institutional vacuum especially in the sense of rule of law. That enabled to “some other” individuals capital acquisition, whose origins is not subject to inspection, although - according to a prevailing belief - that could have been achieved often in direct conjunction with politics dealing and “knowing of right people” at socially (ir)responsible positions. In that way a distinctive stratum (“elite”) was shaped in local milieu. Therefore, some values such as quality education and hard work still have greater importance for few individuals from our research samples, but they also situate those values to the category of (desirable) “long past”, and sometimes desirable future. The present time, they say, does not tolerate those values. These are the things when respondents talk “generally”. Nevertheless, when they talk about their own engagement in everyday life, then respondents/female respondents emphasize their family household members – in the way of their own social position improvement – apply socially the most desirable strategies; primarily through the commitment for hard work and rarely indeed for quality education. For that claim, data from the research conducted in RS are illustrated separately (Table 6).

Table 6: Opinion of respondents on that which strategy prevails in the effort of his/her household to improve its social position

Strategy which prevails	Number	%
Origin from rich family	1	0.2
Quality education	125	25.6
Ambitiousness	33	6.8
Hard work	298	61.1
Knowing of right people	10	2.0
Political engagement	6	1.2
Risk readiness at work	7	1.4
Dexterity in compliance with statutory requirements	2	0.4
Obedience	6	1.2
Total number of respondents	488	100

Such replies partly indicate the efforts of respondents to keep up “normality”, which was immanent to their family households before the war conditions. Although it may not be surely claimed that respondents/female respondents during the interview with the researcher were not assessing which replies would be “the most desirable”, and data listed in *Table 6* clearly indicate that they - in their “survival” strategies - rely on their own resources, primarily

on “hard work”. In both researches, respondents/female respondents have the feeling of strong need to deploy all their resources for the preservation of functionality of their own family households, through employment and searching for the employment, through psycho-social support provision to other family members, and through common spending of spare time. On that way, they say they are being engaged in the activities available to them, since their basic priority is to preserve “the family unity”.

3.2 How respondents/female respondents understand socio-cultural capital of their household in the conditions of post-war and post-socialist transformations

The application of different working strategies (and, in post-war societies, strategies of elementary survival) is one of the basic features of market relationships in modern societies. Bearing that in mind, post-war/post-socialist societies of Western Balkan have real basis for application of those “divertive” strategies. “Nevertheless, each possible working strategy is not compatible with the democratic character of guidance to modern societies. Thus, in market oriented ways of doing business, such working strategies may be developed, which do not support the development of social relationships” (Milošević, 2011: 185). In the societies with developed market relationships, the working strategies are in compliance with the institutional regulation of the entire “state apparatus”, from which it follows that market relationships and the processes are to be in compliance with the formal legal and informal socio-cultural values (“business ethics” and humanization of the entire social relationships). Taking into account that general knowledge on modern societies, it is difficult to suppose that post-socialist and post-war societies have only positive features, which would condition working strategies of individual development, their households and different organizations in which they are operating. Therefore, the already mentioned collapse of the value system and distrust among individuals in state institutions indicate to the unnecessary “dexterity” of the official state institutions to support their citizens in the way of working strategies development.

In previous parts of our analysis, we have already said something on the kinds of strategies which family households members of RS and the North of Kosovo* are ready to take over, in the way of everyday life “progress” of their own families. Nevertheless, for clearer understanding of those strategies, socio-demographic features of those family households will be presented, such as the number of household members, possession of real estate (land, shops, and - for citizens from Kosovo* - real estate out of that territory). Those indicators will provide us with an insight of the resources which social actors are disposing of in the way of working strategies development, and in order to acquire capital (economic one, in the first place).

Table 7: Number of household members in RS

Number of household members	Number of households	%
1 member	15	5.1
2 members	63	21.2
3 members	88	29.6
4 members	104	35.0
5 members	17	5.7
6 members	10	3.4
Total number of households	297	100

Table 8: Number of household members in the North of Kosovo*

Number of members in a household	Number of households	%
1 member	0	0
2 members	24	20
3 members	27	22.5
4 members	33	27.5
5 members and more	36	30
Total number of households	120	100

Table 9: Households possessing land and commercial space in RS


Households possessing:	Number of households	%
Commercial space	19	6.00
Land	237	79.84
Without reply	39	14,26
Total number of households	297	100

In both researches (in RS and Kosovo*) the majority consists of households with four, five or more members, and it is about families composed of parents and their children. Regarding our interest for the determination of the working strategies undertaken by family households, we were also interested in the kind of material capital they possess. Following the example of respondents from RS, it turned out households possessed mostly land, and more rarely commercial space, while it is not the case with respondents from the North of Kosovo* – who mainly live in urban milieu (and do not possess land), and in the total sample of those respondents there were not families possessing commercial space (“shops”).

In the research conducted in the North of Kosovo*, more respondents/female respondents declared themselves on the possession of real estate outside of the territory of Kosovo* (*Chart 4*). It is mostly about the belonging of ethnic Serbian families. They emphasize they bought real estates in the territory of Central Serbia, in the case of recurrence of armed conflicts to have their own “roof over their heads”. Therefore, buying of those pieces of real

estate is not in direct connection with households working strategies, but of fear from (repeated) forced migration. Nevertheless, having on mind the fact that real estate outside Kosovo* mostly represent houses with gardens, we may suppose that their owners have just bought that kind of real estate, so as to be able during forced migrations to “produce” some food in their gardens on their own, or to be able to perform additional work (“home workshops”). Nevertheless, that kind of working strategy cannot be aligned in the category of “Working strategy of household”, but it is primarily about the strategy with short-term outcomes, and at the same time unsustainable for the survival (and development) of a household. Differently from the respondents of Serbian ethnical origin, respondents of Albanian ethnic background bought their real estate outside of Kosovo*, exclusively by touristic reasons (mostly at the Adriatic Coast, in Albania), which testifies on the conviction of ethnical Albanians that a peaceful future at (“their”) Kosovo* is being created.

Figure 4: Possession (non-possession) of real estates outside of Kosovo*



According to the obtained data, respondents from RS are more organized regarding their working strategies, than the ones from the North of Kosovo*, especially when one takes into account possession and work on arable land (either as a way of primary or additional work, which provides those family households with sustainable existence in post-war circumstances). In the research conducted in the North of Kosovo*, it is about respondents whose families live and work exclusively in urban milieu, and who do not possess farmland in the country, so that they exclusively rely on working strategies which are realized in that/urban environment. Taking into account the great number of population on a relatively small area (due to the influx of a great number of internally displaced persons from other parts of Kosovo* to the North of that Serbian province, firstly in 1999 and then in 2004), it is clear that there are not enough jobs for all working-age members, due to which expectations from the state institutions of

(Serbia) are higher than it is the case with respondents from RS. That further led us to conduct an analysis of the replies to the question regarding the disposal of (restricted) material resources of households in both societies. It is shown that - in the example of RS - mostly men ("heads of family") decide on the material resources disposal, while in the North of Kosovo*, men "are leaving" that commitment increasingly to women. The first case is a clear indicator of traditionally-patriarchal social pattern, which has been revitalized in post-war social conditions, while in the second one we are coming across a kind of paradox that men more often leave to women the disposal of household resources, because it is about very restricted resources which are not sufficient to meet the needs of all its members. Therefore, women are given only one more (ungrateful) and callous responsibility in the sphere of everyday lifetime survival of their families. Therefore, the similarity in both societies is reflected in the fact that the greatest part of household budget "goes" to consumption (housing, food, hygiene, education of children and their "pocket money"), so that they have little or no resources for any "investment", which would be a driver of more quality family life in future.

It follows that the greatest number of family households live in shortage, although at the beginning of this research they classified themselves in the category of "middle class" (RS) or "those of middle class" (the North of Kosovo*). All jobs that can be performed in households independently, and without the paid assistance (production of food and drinks, self-repairing appliances at home, painting, repair of clothing/sewing, and care of children, elderly, sick without institutional support of the society) are performed by their actors independently. The available knowledge and skills of family household members, therefore, represent the basic "human resource" or the framework of working strategies of family households in post-socialist, and primarily, post-war societies of RS and the North of Kosovo*.

4. Socio-cultural capital of family and possibility (impossibility) of household working strategies in the Republic of Srpska and in the North of Kosovo and Metohija

(Instead of conclusion)

In the previous analysis we argued some empirical findings on the families' socio-cultural capital features, and their households in societies passing simultaneously through two complex processes: the process of post-socialist and the one of post-war transformation. Those processes of "long duration" (two decades), conditioned life, work, habits, and formation of life of the entire generations which do not remember the essential peaceful social conditions of life under socially safer conditions (a kind of socialist "welfare state", in former Yugoslavia). Those social factors, which in turn remember them, speak about that period with sadness and nostalgia, but everyday life as the core of social life

of individual “now and here” inexorably “forces” those individuals to finding strategies – primarily of survival, and afterwards the ones for family progress.

By this research contribution we indicated some congruity (incongruity) of the two post-war societies RS and Kosovo*, which - until two decades ago - belonged to the same society. We did that from the perspective of family socio-cultural capital, which appeared to be as an important fact for possible working strategies of households in the societies of post-war and post-socialist transformation. The basic conclusion we reached in both researches was an equivocal belief of the author/researcher that the trend of “survival” strategy would be continued (for, at least, one decade). Nevertheless, the more those two post-war societies “are moving away” from the initial conditions of transition, such as privatization, democratization, reshaping of work organization in accordance with market-related transactions (which will result in their competitive involvement in international market economy), “more family strategies will shift significantly: from service-productive-consuming toward classical consuming function of household, but such consuming function which will assume new contents directed toward the improvement of life quality of its members”. (Milošević, 2011: 190).

Such a trend has not been visible yet in societies being in the focus of our previous analysis (societies of RS and Kosovo*). Due to that, we will be able to claim that actors/households from both societies in future will exclusively rely on “human resources” and socio-cultural capital of the family, since - during the two-decade transition period - it has been proven that family is the basis not only of psychological but also of socio-economic security. Possible changes of household strategies in the near future in both cases – the societies of RS and Kosovo* – will be under the impact of chaotic strategic (post-socialist and post-war) business orientations. Therefore, there is a dominant strategy orientation not only in business, but in the entire social organization as well, which has got a neoliberal ideology for its basis in those societies (Milošević, 2004b: 143). It may be expected from that strategic orientation to “have impact on the adaptation of family strategies to other organizational forms of labour (production, distribution, exchange, and consumption), and to have impact on all of them (together), in order to shape them in that form providing necessary harmony with socio-cultural specificities of regions and local milieu, in order to reach greater profit” (Milošević, 2011: 191). Under such circumstances, values like quality education and hardworking would be apparent, which would enable the local population possibilities for improvement of the social position of their families, households, and their own.

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СОЦИО-КУЛТУРНИОТ КАПИТАЛ КАКО ОСНОВА ЗА РАБОТНАТА СТРАТЕГИЈА ЗА ДОМАКИНСТВОТА/СЕМЕЈСТВОТА ВО ПОСТКОНФЛИКТНИТЕ ОПШТЕСТВА: ПРИМЕРОТ НА РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА И СЕВЕРНО КОСОВО*

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Апстракт: Овој труд ги претставува резултатите од компаративното истражување на бележите на социо-културниот капитал како основа за работни стратегии за домаќинствата/семејствата во постконфликтните општества од поранешната СФРЈ/Западен Балкан. Република Српска и Косово* претставуваат студии на случај поради низа сличности кои се инхерентни за овие општествени рамки и одредени специфичности што ги прават „оригинални“ случаи во општествените истражувања. Резултатите од нашето истражување индицираат кон извесна ретрадиционализација на улогата на поствоените членови на семејството вклучувајќи ги нивните напори да ја одржат функционалноста и единството на семејството „по секоја цена“ во општествата „со висок ризик“. Покрај ова, овие резултати упатуваат на низа други стратегии кои индивидуите и нивните домаќинства ги преземаат со цел да ја зачуваат „нормалноста“ на секојдневниот живот во општества соочени со превалентни националистички идеологии дваесет или петнаесет години по завршувањето на отворените воени конфликти, кои го „попречуваат“ етаблирањето на мирни услови за живот и работа. Во првиот дел од трудот, упатуваме на хронологијата на настаните обликувани во двете спомнати општества во форма на поствоени општества со цел појасно да се визуелизира значењето на социо-културниот капитал, како услов за развивање на работни стратегии за поствоените семејни домаќинства.

Клучни зборови: социо-културен капитал, домаќинство, постконфликтно/поствоено општество, постсоцијалистичка трансформација, Република Српска, Косово